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Leaving the Parental Home: An Overview
of the Current State of Genocide Studies1
Daniel Feierstein
Centre for Genocide Studies at the National University of
Tres de Febrero
This article examines current developments in genocide studies, focusing specifically on three main areas of conflict and debate between different perspectives:
the question of how to define genocide, causal models and comparative studies,
and prevention. Further, this article presents an analysis of Eurocentrism in the
field, arguing that genocide studies needs a broader scope to include new and
unique perspectives from all areas of the world. What is needed, in fact, is genuine
intercultural dialogue, which can transform the field of genocide studies into a
broad, culturally diverse field.
Key words: genocide studies, genocide prevention, social sciences

Genocide studies, in its broad sense, emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s from
a fertile intersection of law, history, psychology, and social science. Most early work
was published in English in the United States, Great Britain, Canada, and Israel.
Since the early 1990s, however, genocide studies has grown in two parallel directions.
First, it has become more interdisciplinary, bringing fresh insights from political
science, anthropology, philosophy, aesthetics, and psychoanalysis. Second, it has
become more intercultural. Works are now being published in many languages,
including Slavic languages (Russian, Serbo-Croatian, and Bosnian), Spanish and
Portuguese (from the Americas as well as the Iberian Peninsula), French, Italian,
and Hungarian. In short, a new generation of scholars is beginning to contribute to
the field while also engaging in debates over critical issues with the founding fathers.
In this article I examine three main areas of conflict and debate between different perspectives: (1) the question of how to define genocide, (2) causal models and
comparative studies, and (3) the link to prevention.
In doing so, I hope to clear the ground for genuine intercultural dialogue. In
my view, such dialogue is vital to transforming genocide studies from a minor subdiscipline into a broad, interdisciplinary, and culturally diverse field for exploring
and modifying social practices.

The Question of Definitions
Genocide studies first emerged largely as a result of legal and sociological debates
about the adequacy of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948
(UNCG). Most early work highlighted the serious shortcomings in the legal definition
of genocide (especially the exclusion of certain groups) and proposed new definitions.
Examples of this approach can be found in the work of Vahakn Dadrian, Irving Louis
Horowitz, Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, Helen Fein, Israel Charny, Barbara
Harff and Ted Gurr, and Ben Kiernan, among others.2 One of the few exceptions
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was the pioneering work of Leo Kuper, who finally accepted the legal definition with
the following reservations:
This is not to say that I agree with the definition. On the contrary, I believe a major
omission to be in the exclusion of political groups from the list of groups protected.
In the contemporary world, political differences are at the very least as significant a
basis for massacre and annihilation as racial, national, ethnic or religious differences.
Then too, the genocides against racial, national, ethnic or religious groups are generally
a consequence of, or intimately related to, political conflict.3

Disagreements over definitions led scholars to develop a rich variety of concepts
based on alternative definitions of genocide. However, there is no consensus about
which of these definitions should or could replace the one accepted by the 1948
UNCG.
The disagreements have been reflected in the wide disparity between scholars in
regards to which cases of mass killing merit the label of genocide. A classic example
of paradigmatic and contradictory views is the opposing views of Steven L. Katz and
Israel W. Charny. Katz argued that the Holocaust is the only genocide that has
occurred in modern history, while Charny proposed a ‘‘generic definition’’ of genocide, which allows a much greater number of cases of mass killing to be identified
as ‘‘genocides’’ and may include even the destruction of the environment (ecocide)
or other types of human losses. This discussion typifies the wide conceptual gap
between exclusivism and inclusivism and has aptly been dubbed the ‘‘Katz-Charny
conundrum’’ by Henry Huttenbach.4
During the negotiations that led up to the Rome Statute for an International
Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998, all attempts to introduce a broader definition of genocide failed and the formal definition of the 1948 UNCG was adopted.5 At the same
time, though, the Rome Statute introduced a new, extended definition of ‘‘crimes
against humanity.’’ This persuaded many scholars to change their approach and
accept the inadequate definition of the 1948 UNCG as the only possible way of establishing common ground within the academic community.
In this regard, Matthias Bjornlund, Eric Markusen and Martin Mennecke argue,
[I]t is widely recognized that the prevention of genocide depends mainly on political
will, and the definition of genocide that politicians rely on is an authoritative interpretation of the UNGC [United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide]. Less authoritative and widespread definitions cannot
be expected to impact significantly on decision makers.6

Further, they claim,
It is impossible to find a workable definitional core that completely satisfies every
scholar, but hopefully exclusivists as well as inclusivists are able to see the advantages
of sharing some widely recognized common ground. Perhaps, genocide scholars who
have given up on the UNGC might be well-advised to reconsider it, at least as a workable alternative to the present anarchy in definitions.7

Indeed, William Schabas, a legal scholar, has suggested that the debate over
definitions should be closed. In his view, ‘‘instead of enlarging the definition of genocide in order to accomplish this [i.e., fill the gaps in the law], the international community should opt for an expanded view of crimes against humanity instead.’’ 8
Previous to this, Schabas had advocated for relegating ‘‘the concept of genocide to
the more general and more easily applicable concept of crimes against humanity.’’ 9
While this position has been accepted by some pioneers of genocide studies, this mainly
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juridical ‘‘consensus’’ has been, and should be, strongly questioned for two primary
reasons:
1. The concept of crimes against humanity often refers to the indiscriminate
killing of civilians and so lacks the explanatory power of the concept of
genocide, which refers to the attempted destruction of a group.
2. The wording of Article II of the 1948 Genocide Convention violates the
principle of equality before the law by placing some target groups under its
protection and not others. The law defines the crimes as actions, not allowing
us to distinguish between those who suffer from these actions. Homicide is
the killing of a person, any person. If genocide is the intention to annihilate
a group as such, it does not matter which groups are targeted, and it is
contrary to the principle of equality before the law to decide otherwise. Any
group that might be targeted should also be protected. International law
allows the principle of equality before the law to take precedence over other
particular laws. To violate this principle is to violate the concept of law
itself.10
There have been alternative proposals proffered within sociology and anthropology.
Harff and Gurr (1988), for example, developed the concept of politicide to refer to the
destruction of political groups.11 However, the distinction between politicide and
genocide is difficult to apply in practice, and Harff and Gurr themselves concluded
that most of the cases they had examined were geno-politicides. In addition, the
term politicide has not been widely accepted by legal experts and courts and does
not resolve the legal problem of Article II of the 1948 UNCG, that is, its violation of
legal principles and its use of different legal definitions for the same practice directed
at different victims.
The geopolitical dimensions of the debate over definitions should not be underestimated. As Schabas suggested, in the current century international criminal
courts have treated nearly all human rights violations as crimes against humanity
and few as genocide (that is, the sentences of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) and cases filed by the ICC). The treatment of most human rights violations
as crimes against humanity blurs the distinction between, say, sporadic instances of
violent repression and campaigns of annihilation.
This leveling of differences has then been used to justify the need for ‘‘intervention’’ (particularly, military intervention) in all kinds of cases, as the current situation in Libya has illustrated. Thus, outrage at the Nazi Holocaust or the Rwandan
massacres can be capitalized on to justify military interventions all over the world,
from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya to possible like cases in Korea, Iran, or some
Latin American democracies that threaten US interests, such as Venezuela, Bolivia,
and Ecuador.
Of course, scholars who argue for this type of conceptual leveling would not
necessarily support military intervention in any of these countries. But this is how
their work has been used by politicians who are willing to override established legal
principles and definitions. We will return to this issue later under the discussion of
prevention.
Suffice it to say for now that there are currently two positions on the problem
of definitions. On the one hand, a significant number of researchers now follow the
definition of the UNCG, including many of the Anglo-Saxon pioneers who had
formerly rejected it before the Rome Statute of 1998. Of course, not all these scholars
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think alike, and there are many exceptions and nuances, such as Israel Charny and
Barbara Harff, among others.
On the other hand, most scholars outside the Anglo-Saxon world—for example, in
Argentina, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, or Uruguay—are still struggling,
even in courts, to find an acceptable definition for genocide.12 They avoid using the
definition of the UNCG for historical and sociological purposes because it violates
the principle of equality before the law. At the same time, they are concerned that,
for want of a satisfactory definition, international condemnation of any human rights
violation, severe or otherwise, could be used to justify the violation of a state’s territorial sovereignty.
It should be noted that many states have, in recent years, adopted much better
legal definitions of genocide than that of the UNCG. This has provided fresh impetus
to continue the struggle for a more precise international definition in keeping with
the principle of equality before the law.13

Causal Models and Comparative Studies
The debate over causation has been one of the richest and most productive in the
development of genocide studies. Work in this area is characterized by a wide range
of explanations about the causes and origins of genocides. It is true that most historians have been reluctant to consider the common features of different processes
of annihilation, preferring to emphasize the uniqueness of each historical process.
But the levels of analysis applied to each specific historical situation have been both
numerous and diverse.
For example, a bewildering variety of approaches has been called upon to explain
the Nazi genocide, including studies of the development of Nazi ideology,14 the role
of racism and/or anti-Semitism,15 the role played by anti-Communist and counterrevolutionary struggle,16 the importance of the confiscation of Jewish property,17 the
role of bureaucracy in organizing the extermination,18 the genealogy of Nazi violence,19
and the importance of Jewish identity as something complex, ambiguous, and at odds
with the hegemonic idea of a Europe built on the nation-state.20 A similar mixed set
of approaches has been applied to Rwanda,21 Cambodia,22 and other genocides.
On the other hand, there have been far fewer comparative studies, and those
that have been conducted are largely from the past fifteen years or so. The reason
for this is, as was previously mentioned, that many historians feel that a search for
shared features and causal explanations would deny the historical uniqueness of
different instances of genocide, particularly the Nazi annihilation of the Jewish
population in Europe. Some of the comparative studies, however, deserve special
mention (in particular those that examine the similarities and differences between
the Armenian and the Jewish genocide) as certain key works have formed the basis
of other comparative studies.
One of the best-known authors in comparative genocide studies, the US-Armenian
genocide scholar Vahakn Dadrian, has argued in several works that it is both possible
and desirable to compare the genocide of the Armenian and Jewish peoples. His work,
in fact, has traced lines of convergence and divergence between the Jewish and the
Armenian genocides. Among other factors, similarities include the minority status of
both peoples and their history of persecution, their vulnerability in the territories
where they lived, the presence of the necessary social conditions and structures
for their annihilation, and the crucial roles played by political parties—the German
National Socialist party and the Ittihad party of the Young Turks. More recently,
Dadrian has included the 1994 Rwandan experience in his comparative analysis
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of genocide.23 In his 2004 article ‘‘Patterns of Twentieth Century Genocides: The
Armenian, Jewish, and Rwandan Cases,’’ Dadrian traces a thread through three
genocidal processes in which the victims were chosen because of their ethnicity,
even though ethnicity is a questionable concept in the case of Rwanda, where tensions between Hutu and Tutsi—groups that shared the same language, culture, and
religion—were exacerbated by Belgian colonialism in the twentieth century. Be that
as it may, such discussion does not diminish Dadrian’s argument.24
Another example of comparative genocide studies can be found in Ben Kiernan’s
work. Like Dadrian, Kiernan began by specializing in a particular instance of genocide, the Khmer Rouge genocide, before moving on to comparative studies. His aim
has been to situate the Cambodian massacres within a historical sequence of mass
killings, including, of course, the most emblematic case of the twentieth century, the
Holocaust.25 Unlike Dadrian, however, Kiernan had to come to terms with the fact
that the Cambodian genocide was carried out essentially for political reasons, while
the UNCG expressly excludes crimes against political groups. Accordingly, Kiernan
compares the Holocaust and the Armenian genocide not with Rwanda but with three
cases where the political-ideological nature of genocide is obvious: Cambodia, where
state-sponsored killing was carried out in the name of radical Communism; Indonesia,
which suffered a vast anti-Communist purge in the mid 1960s; and East Timor, where
a dispute over self-determination with the colonial power, Portugal, was followed by
25 years of brutal Indonesian military occupation.
After analyzing the discourses surrounding these different genocides, Kiernan
concludes that racism is always used to construct the ‘‘enemy.’’ However, Kiernan
argues that racism should be construed in a broad sense as focusing on ethnic, religious, or political affiliations. In fact, racist ideology gives meaning to the processes
of stigmatization and subsequent annihilation, regardless of the actual concepts used
to describe and identify the enemy in any specific case. Kiernan also claims that
territorial expansion plays a fundamental role in genocidal states, as do various
ways of idealizing a peasant population that is supposedly ‘‘less civilized’’ and, therefore, less exposed to the ‘‘evils of urban life,’’ both material and moral.
Kiernan and Dadrian make different assumptions about causation, and these
assumptions are implicit in their choice of examples. Thus, Dadrian tends to emphasize ethnic hatred, while Kiernan emphasizes ideological factors. This is true even
when they are discussing the same genocides—the Armenian Massacres and the
Nazi Holocaust. Although these are mostly differences in emphasis rather than
substance, they have the potential to create different and potentially contradictory
explanations of genocidal social practices.
A third example is the case of Enzo Traverso, an Italian historian who proposes
an interesting and unorthodox historical sequence that takes the Holocaust as its
endpoint rather than its starting point. In his 2003 book, The Origins of Nazi Violence,
Traverso traces the legacy of European violence that created Nazism, especially genocides committed under European colonialism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. He thus examines the German annihilation of the Herero and Nama peoples
of Namibia at the beginning of the twentieth century, and Mussolini’s use of poison
gas against tribesmen during the Italian conquest of Abyssinia in 1935, which Henry
Huttenbach has seen as a precursor to the Nazi gas chambers.26
Working outside of the English-speaking world, Traverso rejects the notion of
common totalitarian threads between Nazism and Stalinism. This is in sharp contrast to the approach of conservative historian Ernst Nolte, who sees Nazism as a
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European response to the Bolshevik terror from Asia.27 In Traverso’s view, Nazi
genocidal policy is linked to the legacy of colonialism through the concepts of total
war and conquest. Traverso shows that the Nazi atrocities that so shocked European
public opinion after the Second World War had been committed without causing much
moral concern. This approach has much in common with those of Dirk Moses, Donald
Bloxham, Juergen Zimmerer, Dominik Schaller, and a group of Anglo-Saxon and Australian scholars devoted to exploring the link between genocide and imperialism.28
In France, Jacques Semelin has also mapped out a comparative study of Nazi
Germany, Rwanda, and former Yugoslavia. He highlights the discourses used to stigmatize otherness, the international context, the role of the media, and the dynamics
of mass murder, among other factors. Finally, in analyzing the political uses of
massacres in these three case histories, Semelin distinguishes between ‘‘destroying to subjugate’’ and ‘‘destroying to eradicate,’’ adding a third possible category:
‘‘destruction to revolt.’’ 29
This review of comparative studies is necessarily incomplete, and I have omitted
some studies because of their questionable ideological legitimacy.30 I would like to
add some comments on my own comparative work, in which I set out to account for
the similarities and differences between the Nazi genocide and state terrorism in
Argentina. While recognizing the obvious differences between the two in terms of
size, scale, and method of implementation, my work emphasizes some striking structural similarities, including the central role played by concentration camps in
destroying subjectivity. I have also created the concept of genocidal social practices
to account for shared features of the concentration camp system in different historical
contexts. I define genocidal social practices in these cases as ‘‘a technology of power
that is intended to destroy social relations based on autonomy and cooperation by killing a significant portion of society (significant in numbers or influence) and that then
attempts to create new social relations and identity models through terror.’’ 31
One of my main concerns has been to show the different ways in which annihilation has served to transform social relations. Genocide is not the only way to transform societies, but, together with revolution, it has been a very successful method
during the twentieth century. However, although revolutions have also destroyed
and reorganized social relations, they have not necessarily done so through mass
annihilation. This is the main difference between revolution and genocide. In such a
perspective, what many modern cases of genocide have in common (and Nazism and
Argentina share) is that the perpetrators sought to annihilate their enemies both
materially and symbolically. Not just their bodies but also the memory of their existence was supposed to disappear, forcing survivors to deny their own identity. In this
sense, the disappearances outlast the destruction of war, and the effects of genocide
do not end but rather only begin with the deaths of the victims. In short, this kind
of objective view of genocidal destruction is the transformation of the victims into
nothing and the survivors into nobodies.
To sum up, our understanding of the causes and consequences of genocidal processes is far from complete. But we can also look on this as a strength, not a weakness,
given that all historical events have multiple causes, including the different motives of
the various actors involved, and multiple consequences. The rich profusion of recent
publications has brought new perspectives to bear on the logic of mass annihilation of
populations and the political, social, symbolic, and conceptual consequences generated
by destruction and terror in the societies in which genocide has taken place.
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Perspectives on Prevention
An important feature of genocide studies over the last twenty years has been an
increased emphasis on applying academic theories to preventing genocide. However,
the predominant thinking in the Anglo-Saxon world has tended to oversimplify the
relationship between theory and prevention, which is tricky and dangerous.
Since the late 1990s, there have been various attempts to establish early warning
mechanisms capable of recognizing potentially genocidal situations from a number of
variables. One of the most sophisticated is that of Barbara Harff and Ted Gurr,
which uses six key variables (among many others) to predict genocide: (1) degree
of political conflict, (2) existence of previous genocide, (3) ideology of the ruling elite,
(4) regime type, (5) ethnic situation, and (6) openness to trade. It also identifies a
number of genocide ‘‘accelerators.’’ 32
Beyond the problems of statistical inference and the potential discussions surrounding each of the variables, the core questions are:
1. Is it indeed possible to identify common features of genocides, and, more
importantly,
2. What is the next step in identifying potentially genocidal situations?
In the twenty-first century there have been a number of publications on prevention by US-based scholars and officials putting forward the hegemonic view. This
type of work lacks the seriousness of Harff and Gurr’s and focuses only on the
political will of the different actors—notably the US—to intervene in potentially
genocidal situations.
Two well-known examples of this widespread and banal approach are the reports
Preventing Genocide, which appeared under the Bush administration in 2008, and
MARO: Mass Atrocity Response Operations, which was published under the auspices
of the Obama administration in 2010.33
These kinds of perspectives reflect a point of view that is clearly discernible in
Samantha Power’s A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide, which
focuses on genocide in Cambodia, Rwanda, and the Balkans. Power, a freelance war
correspondent during the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, has done perhaps more
than anyone else to shape the way in which US citizens view their country’s relationship to genocide.34 Power’s book can be seen as a denouncement of ‘‘failure’’ on the
part of the United States to prevent, slow down, or hinder the development of
genocidal processes when it has had the power to do so.
The authors of these perspectives have not fully thought through the implications of their ideas. For example, a key idea running through such works is the
need to limit national sovereignty in order to prevent genocidal practices. But, simultaneously, no one points out that the US has refused to sign different international
treaties on the grounds that to do so would limit state sovereignty. Indeed, the US
has been so determined not to sacrifice an inch of its sovereignty that it voted
against the ICC Statute at the Rome Conference in 1998, which was established
precisely to prosecute individuals for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes.
Moreover, these perspectives do not make it clear to whom the alleged perpetrators of such crimes are supposed to surrender state sovereignty. There is no suggestion in these perspectives that greater powers should be vested, for example, in
the United Nations, in regional organizations, or in international courts. So, in the
absence of any clearly defined international body with powers to determine that
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genocide or other heinous crimes are being committed and to intervene accordingly,
charges of genocide could easily be manipulated. From here it would be a short step
to justify unilateral diplomatic, economic, or military intervention anywhere in the
world. Conversely, no international, regional, or US organization would have the
power to intervene if US citizens committed similar crimes at home or abroad.
Immunity would very quickly become impunity.
An early critique of interventionist policies can be found in Thomas Cushman’s
article ‘‘Is Genocide Preventable?’’ 35 Cushman argues convincingly that these approaches to preventing genocide rest on two unproven assumptions: (1) that advance
warning of genocide would lead to effective measures to prevent it and (2) that
modernity and genocide are opposing forces. The second of these assumptions, of
course, implies that with sufficient political will genocide could be eradicated by
‘‘modern’’ methods.
Cushman calls this a ‘‘naturalistic approach [that] favors structural forces over
human agency in the explanation of genocide.’’ Referring to ‘‘expressions of ideological
commitment to the idea of prevention to genocide,’’ he notes that ‘‘[t]here is . . . a
rather glaring discrepancy between such ritual statements and the magnitude and
complexity of the phenomenon of genocide itself.’’ 36
Cushman’s solution is much less developed than his critique. However, his intuition that modernity and genocide are not necessarily at loggerheads suggests that
useful contributions to prevention could come from researching those modern features that actually facilitate the processes of genocide, thus developing a kind of
work similar to the Frankfurt School scholars such as Theodor Adorno, Walter
Benjamin, or Max Horkheimer or the work of Zygmunt Bauman, among others.
This is likely to lead to much farther-reaching changes than political will could.
Once we understand genocide as process, a series of actions occurring over time,
we cannot fail to notice that many of its early stages (stigmatization, harassment,
isolation) exist in virtually all modern states and not just in sub-Saharan Africa or
the Middle East, as ethnocentric ‘‘interveners’’ believe. Current examples range
from the persecution of Roma in France, Italy, and Spain and limitations on the civil
rights of Muslims in Germany and France to the anti-immigration laws of Arizona
and a battery of discriminatory measures against Latinos in the US generally.
The issue of prevention has tended to divide genocide scholars into those who
hold more ethnocentric and discriminatory views on the causes of genocide and who
call for economic sanctions and US military intervention in order to ‘‘civilize the
savages’’ of third-world Africa, Asia, and Latin America, on the one hand, and those
who resist these positions by retreating to their ivory towers in an attempt to
separate their academic work from its political consequences, on the other hand.
There are, of course, other scholars who criticize and reject this use of ethnocentric
humanitarianism to legitimize new ways of imperialism.
Perhaps human rights activists from different cultural backgrounds will be able
to use academic research to draw different political conclusions. I am referring to
members of organizations further away from the hegemonic powers’ places of decision making, organizations such as the World Social Forum, the Permanent Peoples’
Tribunal, and African and Latin American regional organizations, all of which
include a large number of academics. They are perhaps more likely to take into
account the complexity of genocide and the necessarily complex nature of any political
strategy of prevention.
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A Cultural Issue
Numerous studies have shown that language affects thought processes. There are
huge differences, for example, between philosophical works written in English and
works written in other European languages, and these differences are even greater
when works are written in Hebrew, Chinese, or Arabic. Each language imposes certain
conditions, restraints, and directions on both the form and content of thought, giving
rise to different—and rewarding—academic approaches.
Unfortunately, although many academic fields have been victims to the steamroller of globalization, this is particularly true of genocide studies, which is a relatively recent discipline and has developed almost entirely in the English-speaking
world. Also, genocide studies have been more permeated than most by the hegemony
of English in the twenty-first century. As a result, cultural exchanges, where they
exist at all, are nearly always one-sided. For example, work produced in Slavic or
Romance languages—two key areas of development in the twenty-first century—
discusses, cites, and questions the literature written in English or German, but not
so the other way around.
There are many reasons for chronic Anglo-centrism in our field. One problem is
the absurd editorial policies of the Anglo-Saxon world, which have eliminated funding for translations since the 2008 economic crisis, arguing that the lingua franca of
academia is English and that work should be submitted in English only for evaluation prior to publication. This effectively limits those authors who have learned to
write in English because of family, educational opportunities, or other contact with
the English-speaking world.
Another problem is that even where funding is available, specialized journals,
the backbone of academic research, have no policies prioritizing the translation of
work produced in different cultures. Again, this contrasts with developments in Latin
America and East Asia, where there are policies for the more or less systematic translation of classic and contemporary works from English, German, or French.
And now for a cautionary tale. There has been a wealth of articles published in
Spanish and Bosnian, among other languages, in recent years.37 Their treatment
of genocide is broader than that found in English and yet they will remain forever
inaccessible to monolingual scholars unless publishers and journals provide updates
on developments and discussions that occur outside their own cultural context. This
one-sidedness will continue to compartmentalize genocide studies, with the more
ethnocentric scholars believing that genocide happens precisely where ‘‘no one speaks
English’’ (whether this be North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, Southeast
Europe, the former Soviet Union, or Latin America).
As a result, most researchers—Anglo-Saxon or otherwise—are forced to examine
different cases of genocide through the distorted lens of work produced by the AngloSaxon world. The authors of this work frequently have a poor command of languages—
Slavic languages, Arabic, Chinese, Spanish, Swahili, or African dialects—and must
enlist the help of local translators and interpreters in an attempt to overcome cultural
barriers, such as ignorance of the history and traditions of the place, the logic of
language and genealogy, the way that conflicts are structured, and so forth.
Often, as happened in nineteenth-century anthropology, they end up trying to
make an incomprehensible reality fit Anglo-Saxon models of understanding, thus
distorting or changing the data. With regard to Latin America, a clear and amusing
example is Oliver Stone’s film South of the Border, which contrasts the US media
view of Latin America with the voices of twenty-first-century democratic presidents
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from the region (characterized in the US political mainstream as ‘‘populists,’’
‘‘demagogues,’’ ‘‘paranoics,’’ etc.).38 Latin America is the closest region in geographical and cultural terms to the US parent culture. What will researchers from the selfstyled parent culture make of the worldviews of Slavic, Oriental, or African cultures?
If Semitic, Slavic, and Oriental cultures are often misunderstood and even demonized,
African cultures are still considered by some as a missing link in human evolution—a
primitive state that would be better left behind.

Conclusions
In the cycle of life, young people become adults when they leave their parents’ house
and set up their own homes elsewhere. This involves exposure to the outside world
which is often a frightening but also refreshing and infinitely rewarding experience.
Using life cycle as a metaphor, it can be argued that the field of genocide studies
emerged from an attempt to work through a trauma in the heart of Europe. Nevertheless, it was adopted by Anglo-Saxon parents and grew up in a cozy American
home frequented by German relatives and visited occasionally by French neighbors.
After nearly half a century of existence, it may be time to get out of the parents’
house and live a truly independent life. This does not mean denying the parents’
legacy. On the contrary, unlike adolescents, adults are able to question what needs
to be questioned and salvage the legitimate and important parts of tradition. To my
mind, this is the greatest challenge for genocide studies in each of the three main
problem areas outlined in this article.
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